

105 學年度佛教學系博士班入學試題

科目：佛學英文

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本試題共 2 面，本頁為第 1 面

試題需收回

試題不需收回

1. Please translate the following three passages into Chinese. (40%)

A.

What is clear, if one examines the canonical use of the word *puñña*, is that it occurs both much less frequently than *kusala* and, on the whole, in a more restricted context. Especially in the earlier texts, it is found mainly in connection with *dāna* and other activities of the lay life. Indeed it is quite commonly used in an expression which describes a motive for a monk to backslide: he can enjoy life's pleasures and still perform acts which bring good fortune (*puññāni*). It also occurs quite often in direct connection with heavenly or other future lives.

---from "Good or Skilful? Kusala in Canon and Commentary"

B.

Politics and the study of Buddhism

In addition to the challenges already mentioned, there has emerged in recent years another category of criticism not yet discussed, one that insists on the fact that politics (and, perhaps more generally, the analysis of power) is relevant to the study of Buddhism in a variety of ways. Most of these works are founded on one or both of the following methodological presuppositions: (1) that cultures are political entities, and (2) that scholarship (for example, the scholarship that takes a Buddhist culture as its object) is never politically neutral, either in its constitution or in its repercussions.

---from "Buddhist Studies as a Discipline and the Role of Theory "

C.

The study of early Chinese Buddhist apocryphal literature constitutes a vast and intriguing field of research, the exploration of which has barely begun. Apocryphal texts are Buddhist works produced in China by (obviously anonymous) Chinese; they pretend to be "translations" of non-Chinese texts, and, being such, to be part of the authentic Buddhist tradition. They generally are short texts, written in a primitive and rather incoherent language, with little doctrinal sophistication, and full of references to ideas and beliefs that are not of Buddhist origin but are part and parcel of the Chinese indigenous tradition such as the Confucian standard virtues; or yin, yang and the Five Elements; and, indeed, they not seldom specifically refer to China itself. In some cases such works somehow have found their way into the Buddhist Canon itself, perhaps because they were not recognized as fakes, or, if they were, they may have been regarded as harmless. But in many other cases, these works were considered heretical, unorthodox, morally subversive, or even politically dangerous, and such works had to be suppressed.

---from "Perspectives in the Study of Chinese Buddhism"

2. Please summarize the following passage in Chinese. (30%)

INTRODUCTION: ON THE NATURE OF BUDDHIST-CHRISTIAN DIALOGUE

Given the wealth and diversity of theological and philosophical opinions in both the Buddhist and Christian traditions, it is incumbent upon those who would engage in dialogue to recognize the limitations of any particular dialogical setting by admitting to the fact that it is at most an interchange between individuals with specific doctrinal views. That both traditions are so rich doctrinally implies, of course, a lack of univocality in both traditions. What this means is that the term "Buddhist-Christian dialogue" is meaningful only as a shorthand expression for the process of interchange between individual Buddhists and Christians, each an advocate of specific doctrinal views. What it means, too, is that there is no such thing as a normative Buddhist-Christian dialogue.

This may seem trivial, but it is an inherent limitation of dialogue that has frequently been overlooked historically. Due partly to ignorance and partly to complacency, we have tended to look upon our dialogue partners as representatives of a normative tradition. What is perhaps more ironic still is that we have ended up with dialogue partners whose doctrinal stance is amazingly similar to our own. Our choice of doctrinally similar partners, whether conscious or not, is partly based on the presupposition that dialogue requires doctrinal similarity, a position that I have argued against elsewhere. Further, it serves the function of legitimizing our own sectarian perspective, for, surely, if I am the Buddhist representative in a Buddhist-Christian dialogue I must be in some significant way Buddhist. Such dimensions of the dialogue, especially its legitimizing functions, can also not be overlooked.

A final note in this preamble: is it not incumbent upon us also to ask what relevance dialogue has to individual Buddhists and Christians? Even assuming that we, as intellectuals, need not be accountable to any constituency over and above our fellow intellectuals, of what relevance is such a dialogue even to the Buddhist philosophers and theologians who share neither our doctrinal presuppositions nor our language? What I am basically arguing for here is the necessity of realizing the limitations of, and the moral responsibilities that accompany, the enterprise of dialogue. What this means is that when we engage in dialogue we must identify the perspective from which we speak. It means, as well, not exploiting dialogue to further the legitimation of any specific doctrinal position.

---from "Liberation: An Indo-Tibetan Perspective "

3. Please answer the following question in Chinese. (30%)

According to Ven. Analayo in his article "The Hīnayāna Fallacy", what are some of the problems with using the term Hīnayāna as a category in the study of Buddhist history?